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Casenotes
AMERICA'S CUP IN AMERICA'S COURT: GOLDEN GATE
YACHT CLUB V. SOCIETE NAUTIQUE DE GENEVD
I. INTRODUCTION: "THE OLDEST CONTINUOUS TROPHY IN SPORTS" 2
One-hundred and thirty-seven ounces of solid silver, standing
over two feet tall, this "One Hundred Guinea Cup" created under
the authorization of Queen Victoria in 1848 is physically what is at
stake at every America's Cup regatta.3 However, it is the dignity,
honor, and national pride that attach to the victor of this cherished
objet d'art that have been the desire of the yacht racing community
since its creation.4 Unfortunately, this desire often turns to envy
and has driven some to abandon concepts of sportsmanship and
operate by "greed, commercialism and zealotry."5 When these prin-
ciples clash "the outcome of the case [will be] dictated by elemental
legal principles."6
1. 907 N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 2009).
2. See America's Cup: History, CBS SPORTs, http://www.cbssports.com/sailing/
americascup/history (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (noting that America's Cup is "the
oldest continuous trophy in sports").
3. See RANuLE RAYNER, THE STORY OF THE AMERICA'S CUP: 1851-1995 34 (War-
wick Publishers 1996) (describing creation and characteristics of actual America's
Cup). See generally Thirty-Third America's Cup Match: Notice of Race 1 15 available
at http://www.alinghi.com/multimedia/docs/2009/11/091110_33rdAmericas_
CupNotice of Race.pdf (posting official prize for winning Thirty-Third
America's Cup).
4. See Hamish Ross, America's Cup History, ALINGHI.COM, http://www.alinghi.
com/en/racing/americas-cup/facts/history.php?idndex=0&idContent=86 9 9
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (chronicling history of America's Cup challenges). The
victor of the Thirty-Third America's Cup described winning as "a fabulous experi-
ence. I am very proud to be part of this team and I am exceptionally proud to
bring the America's Cup back to the United States of America for the first time in
a very long time." Larry Ellison, http://33rd.americascup.com/en/actualite/
news/they-saidquotes-from-bmw-oracle-racing-and-alinghi-19-2913 (last visited Oct.
14, 2010).
5. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d 87,
107 (N.Y. 1990) (Hancock,J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (discussing how com-
mercialism behind America's Cup has led some to perceive sporting regatta as
business).
6. Id. at 96 (Wachtler, C.J., concurring) (noting how case at bar, while com-
paring sportsmanship and business of America's Cup, will be decided by legal prin-
ciples that they raise). For a further discussion on how Golden Gate Yacht Club was
settled based on elemental legal principles, see infra notes 87-108 and accompany-
ing text.
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Indeed, the thirty-third challenge for the Cup found more ac-
tion in New York courtrooms than on the water.7 Wealthy contribu-
tors, state-of-the-art ships and large egos created a predicament that
had to be sorted out before the regatta could get underway.8 This
battle manifested itself in front of the New York Court of Appeals in
the case Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Soci6td Nautique De Gendoe.9
The issue surroundiqg this case dealt with the interpretation of
the Deed of Gift for the America's Cup ("Deed of Gift"), which
granted the America's Cup as a "perpetual Challenge Cup for
friendly competition."10 Section II of this article pertains to the his-
tory of the America's Cup and the document that established it, the
Deed of Gift." Section III outlines some of the legal instrumentali-
ties that are applicable to the case.12 Section IV discusses the
court's application of these instrumentalities to the case at bar.13
Section V analyzes the court's logic in its application of the legal
doctrines or lack thereof.14 Finally, section VI focuses upon the
consequences that the court's decision will have on the America's
Cup and similar legal documents in the future.'5
7. See Posting of Alexander Smith to REUTERS COMMENTARIES BLOC, http://
blogs.reuters.com/commentaries/2009/08/05/time-to-get-americas-cup-back-on-
the-water/ (Aug 5, 2009 13:22 EST) (commenting on extensive legal battles over
thirty-third America's Cup and how legal battles cheapen regatta).
8. See id. (complaining that wealthy yacht owners are preventing Thirty-Third
America's Cup by continuously filing legal motions). See also Cory Friedman, A
Perpetual Cup for Not So Friendly Competition Between Lawyers: Part 52 - Catching the
Ripe Fruit, SCUrrLEBUTT NEWs, Dec 15, 2009, http://www.sailingscuttlebutt.com/
news/07/cf/#p52 (stating that with latest legal battle between Golden Gate Yacht
Club and Soci6t6 Nautique De Geneve being over the clubs can sail Thirty-Third
America's Cup); Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Soci6t6 Nautique De Geneve, 907
N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 2009) (representing last legal hurdle before Thirty-Third
America's Cup).
9. See generally Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 276 (noting legal clash
between Thirty-Third America's Cup regatta to determine rightful participants).
10. See RAYNER, supra note 3, at 36 (discussing original letter by George Schuy-
ler donating America's Cup as one "for friendly competition between foreign
countries"); Deed of Gift for the America's Cup, Oct. 24, 1887, 1 3, available at
http://www.a3.org/ac2000_DeedofGift.html http://.a3.org/ac2000 DeedofGift.
html [hereinafter Deed of Gift] (stating purpose of America's Cup is to foster in-
ternational competition in yacht racing).
11. For a further discussion of the history behind the America's Cup, see infra
notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the applicable legal doctrines, see infra notes
47-86 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the court's application of the legal doctrines,
see infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the court's opinion, see infra notes 109-41 and
accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the impact of the case, see infra notes 144-70
and accompanying text.
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II. "ONE HELL OF A BOAT RACE"16: HisTORY
OF THE AMERICA'S CUP
A. "Your Majesty, There Is No Second"'7
The America's Cup is named after the yacht America, the first
vessel to win the Cup in 1851.18 Upon receiving the Cup, the five
man crew of the America decided to donate it to the New York Yacht
Club.19 The spirit of this donation was to create an international
forum in which yachts from different countries could compete for
the possession of the Cup.20 The document donating the
America's Cup to the New York Yacht Club was called the Deed of
Gift and was drafted by George L. Schuyler, a member of the origi-
nal crew of the America.21 While the Cup was donated in 1857, the
Deed of Gift was modified twice before it became the current Deed
of Gift.22
16. James Spithill, THEY SAID. . . QUOTES FROM BMW ORACLE RACING AND
ALINGHI, http://33rd.americascup.com/en/actualite/news/they-saidquotes-from-
bmw-oracle-racing-and-alinghi-19-2913 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
17. Alfred E. Loomis, "Ah, Your Majesty, there is no second," 9 AMERICAN
HERITAGE MAGAZINE, 5 (Aug. 1958), available at http://www.americanheritage.
com/articles/magazine/ah/1958/5/1958_5_4.shtml (describing events at first
regatta to win America's Cup). Queen Victoria asked a signalmaster at the first
race, "Are the yachts in sight?" Id. To which he answered, "Only the America, may
it please Your Majesty." Id. "Which is second?" she asked. Id. "Ah, Your Majesty,
there is no second," was the answer. Id.
18. See RAYNER, supra note 3, at 36 (describing circumstances of first regatta to
win America's Cup). In fact, the yacht America was so superior to the other yachts
of the day that the regatta to win the Cup was the only one that would accept it as a
challenger. Id. All others turned it away because it would make the race unfair for
the other yachts. Id.
19. See id. (describing reaction to winning Cup and desire to create interna-
tional regatta). The original race for the Cup was one that was open to many
challengers for the Cup; it was not meant to turn into a cup of international com-
petition. See id. (noting history behind international competition). See also Who
Owns the Americas Cup? The Defender, or Persons Unknown?, BYMNEWS.COM,May 2009,
http://www.bymnews.com/americas-cup-33/ownership.php (explaining origins of
Deed of Gift). The five members of the America crew decided to donate the Cup to
the New York Yacht Club while the members met socially at a party. See id. (depict-
ing donation of Cup to New York Yacht Club).
20. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d
87, 89 (N.Y. 1990) (noting original intent by donators to create avenue for friendly
international yacht racing). See generally Deed of Gift, supra note 10 (setting forth
intentions behind donating America's Cup).
21. See RAYNER, supra note 3, at 17 (chronicling Deed of Gift and America's
Cup).
22. See id. at 36 (setting date of original donation by Schuyler to New York
Yacht Club to be 1857). See also Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolution-
izing judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dy-
namic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IowA L. REv. 545, 549-
50 (1989) (describing subsequent America's Cup regattas and their effect on origi-
nal donors to make modifications to Deed of Gift).
2011] 269
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B. The Deed of Gift for the America's Cup2 3
The objective of every America's Cup challenge is to win the
regatta, thereby possessing the Cup and becoming its sole trustee. 24
The holder of the Cup "is to be succeeded by a competitor who
successfully challenges the trustee . . . ."25 The formal submission
by a challenger to the current holder of the Cup to race is called
the Notice of Challenge.26 Once the Notice of Challenge is ac-
cepted by the current holder, the challenger becomes the Chal-
lenger of Record, and the current holder becomes the Defender.27
Within the Deed of Gift, there are certain requirements that
must be met before the regatta can be held.28 For instance, a chal-
lenger must be an organized yacht club of a foreign country and
must hold "an annual regatta on ocean water course on the sea."29
There are also restrictions on the size of the vessels to be used and
the location where the race can take place.30 There is some flexibil-
ity, however, in the conditions of the regatta itself.31 The parties
can, by mutual consent, determine what the course will be, the
23. See Deed of Gift, supra note 10, at Title (setting forth deed donating
America's Cup). The Deed of Gift was written and signed by George L. Schuyler,
the sole survivor of the original America crew at the time of donation, 1887. See id.
1 (asserting Schuyler to be the writer and signor of Deed of Gift).
24. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc., 557 N.E.2d at 89 (describing goal of
America's Cup); Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 2 (laying out circumstances of pass-
ing down America's Cup through regattas).
25. Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc., 557 N.E.2d at 89.
26. See Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Socit6 Nautique De Geneve, 907 N.E.2d
279 (N.Y. 2009) (outlining how America's Cup is initiated).
27. See id. (describing how Soci6t6 Nautiqu de Geneve accepted Club Ndutico
Espafiol de Vela's Notice of Challenge, Soci6t6 Nautiqu de Geneve became De-
fender and Club Ndutico Espahiol de Vela became Challenger of Record).
28. See Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 4-6 (listing all requirements that must be
met before America's Cup can take place).
29. Id. 4. "Any organized Yacht Club . .. having for its annual regatta on
ocean water course on the sea, or on an arm of the sea, or one which combines
both, shall always be entitled to the right of sailing a match for this Cup . . Id.
30. See id. 5.
The competing yachts or vessels, if of one mast, shall be not less than
forty-four feet nor more than ninety feet on the load water-line; if of
more than one mast they shall be not less than eighty feet nor more than
one hundred and fifteen feet on the load water-line.
Id.
[N]o race shall be sailed in the days intervening between November 1st
and May 1st if the races are to be conducted in the Northern Hemi-
sphere; and no race shall be sailed in the days intervening between May
1st and November 1st if the races are to be conducted in the Southern
Hemisphere.
Id. 6.
31. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 279 (noting how yacht clubs can
agree on specific regatta venue conditions).
[Vol. 18: p. 267
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AMERICA'S CUP IN AMERICA'S COURT
number of trials, dates, "and any and all other conditions of the
match."3 2 This resulting agreement made by mutual consent is
called the protocol.33 Other challengers have traditionally been al-
lowed to participate in the regatta as Mutual Consent Challengers,
as provided by past protocols.34 If, for any reason, the two parties
cannot agree to a protocol, then there is a default provision in the
Deed of Gift: a one-on-one match between the Defender and the
Challenger of Record.35
C. The Thirty-Third America's Cup in Court
On July 3, 2007, the same day Socit6 Nautiqu de Geneve
("SNG") won the Thirty-Second America's Cup, Club Ndiutico Espa-
fiol de Vela ("CNEV") submitted its challenge for the Cup.3 6 SNG
32. Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 7. The mutual consent clause in the Deed
of Gift allows the racing clubs to, "by mutual consent, make any arrangement satis-
factory to both as to the dates, courses, number of trials, rules and sailing regula-
tions, and any and all other conditions of the match, in which case also the ten
months' notice may be waived." Id.
33. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 279 (naming resulting agreement
made by competing yacht clubs as "protocol").
34. See id. at 279 (noting how traditionally past protocols have allowed for
other racers to participate). These other racers are called Mutual Consent Chal-
lengers because they are allowed to race as challengers only via the execution of
the mutual consent clause in the Deed of Gift. See id. (discussing what constitutes
Mutual Consent Challenger).
35. See id. at 279 (describing how default provision for regatta venue becomes
invoked if no protocol call can be agreed upon by yacht clubs). See also Deed of
Gift, supra note 10, 1 8 (outlining default provision for regatta venue). The de-
fault provision for the race reads:
In case the parties cannot mutually agree upon the terms of a match,
then three races shall be sailed, and the winner of two of such races shall
be entitled to the Cup. All such races shall be on ocean courses, free from
headlands, as follows: The first race, twenty nautical miles to windward
and return; the second race an equilateral triangular race of thirty-nine
nautical miles, the first side of which shall be a beat to windward; the
third race (if necessary) twenty nautical miles to windward and return;
and one week day shall intervene between the conclusion of one race and
the starting of the next race. These ocean courses shall be practicable in
all parts for vessels of twenty-two feet draught of water, and shall be se-
lected by the Club holding the Cup; and these races shall be sailed sub-
ject to its rules and sailing regulations so far as the same do not conflict
with the provisions of this deed of gift, but without any times allowances
whatever. The challenged Club shall not be required to name its repre-
sentative vessel until at a time agreed upon for the start, but the vessel
when named must compete in all the races, and each of such races must
be completed within seven hours.
Id.
36. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 279 (outlining history behind
case).
2011]1 271
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accepted the challenge and the two parties drafted the protocol.37
Eight days later, on July 11, 2007 Golden Gate Yacht Club
("GGYC") presented its own Notice of Challenge, disputing the va-
lidity of CNEV's challenge on the basis that it was not a qualified
yacht club under the terms of the Deed.38 GGYC pointed to the
fact that CNEV was formed only a few days before its challenge and
accordingly CNEV had never held an annual regatta.39
SNG rejected GGYC's challenge because it had already ac-
cepted CNEV's, and it would not consider any other challenge until
CNEV's was decided.40 Thus, on July 20, SNG submitted to arbitra-
tion to determine the validity of CNEV's challenge under the Deed
of Gift.41 The Arbitration Panel decided that "the Deed of Gift
does not require a challenging club to have held an annual regatta
prior to issuing its Notice of Challenge" and held CNEV's challenge
valid.42
With all parties in agreement that the arbitration decision did
not impose a binding decree, GGYC brought action against SNG
for breaching its fiduciary duty as trustee of the Cup by accepting
CNEV's challenge despite the fact that it had never held a regatta.43
The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the breach of fiduciary
claim, but held that CNEV's challenge was not valid because CNEV
had not held an annual regatta as required in the Deed of Gift. 44 A
divided Appellate division reversed this decision, holding that that
the language of the Deed was too ambiguous and CNEV was the
rightful Challenger of Record. 45 GGYC appealed. 46
37. See id. (noting beginnings of Thirty-Third America's Cup). This meant
that SNG became the Defender and the CNEV the Challenger of Record. See id.
(noting when SNG accepted CNEV's Notice of Challenge, SNG became Defender
and CNEV became Challenger of Record).
38. See id. (establishing origin of questioning validity of Thirty-Third
America's Cup).
39. See id. (describing GGYC's original challenge to CNEV credibility).
40. See id. (noting SNG's response to GGYC's challenge).
41. See id. at 280 (describing mitigating steps taken by SNG in response to
GGYC's challenge). The protocol provided for the arbitration. See id. at 279-80
(explaining how SNG sought arbitration by thirty-third America's Cup Arbitration
Panel as provided by protocol).
42. Id. at 280 (outlining arbitration panel's decision).
43. See id. (noting original charges brought against SNG by GGYC in court).
44. See id. (providing holding of Supreme Court of New York).
45. See id. (stating opinion of Appellate Division of New York). The Appellate
Division found that the phrase "having for its annual regatta" was ambiguous. Id.
at 281). Thus, the court used extrinsic evidence to "glean the settlor's intention as
to the meaning and purpose of this phrase. . . ." Id.
46. See id. at 280 (noting that "GGYC appealed pursuant to CPLR 5601(a)
dissent grounds"). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 87-108 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 18: p. 267
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III. APPLICABLE LEGAL DOCTRINES
In this case were various clashing legal doctrines.47 The New
York Court of Appeals needed to decide what exactly the Deed of
Gift was and which applicable doctrines could be used in its
ruling.48
A. Charitable Trust
A charitable trust is a trust created for religious, charitable, ed-
ucational or any other benevolent purposes.49 Though there is
some reference to charitable trusts in antiquity, it was used in En-
glish chancery court in the middle ages as a way for people to do-
nate money upon their death to the church as penance for their
sins.50 In New York, the charitable trust doctrine was outright
banned in 1788 and continued that way until the Tilden Act of
1892.51
Today, a trust of property may be made for any charitable or
benevolent purpose for an indefinite amount of time or when the
beneficiaries are uncertain.52 If a trustee is named, then it will go
to that trustee.53 A legal corporation, however, can be named as
47. For a further discussion of the law regarding these legal doctrines, see
infra notes 49-87 and accompanying text.
48. See Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Soci6t6 Nautique De Geneve, 907 N.E.2d
276 (N.Y. 2009) (outlining basis of ruling for reviewing court).
49. See ROBERT L. BLEVINS, ET AL., THE TRUST BUSINESS 173 (American Bank-
ers Association 1982) (defining charitable trusts). See also N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUST LAw § 8-1.1(a) (McKinney 2009) (recognizing charitable trusts as valid in
State of New York).
50. See EDITH L. FiscH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (Mat-
thew Bender & Company 1950) (describing origins and original intents of charita-
ble trusts).
51. See id. at 30-38 (noting initial prohibition of charitable trusts in New York
and their eventual legalization). The fact that the Deed of Gift was written before
it was technically legal does not matter; it can still be considered a valid charitable
trust despite the fact that it was written before the Tilden Act. See In re Matter of
Bd. of Tr. of Huntington Free Library & Reading Room, 771 N.Y.S.2d 69, 69 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (holding that charitable trusts created before Tilden Act are still
valid).
52. See N.Y. EST. POwERS & TRUST LAW, § 8-1.1(a) (outlining current New York
law for charitable trusts). The rule against perpetuities and the suspension-of-
alienation rules do not apply to charitable trusts. See In re Hamilton's Will, 63
N.Y.S.2d 265, 267-68 (3rd App. Dep't 1946), affd 296 N.Y. 578 (1946) (holding
that charitable trusts are not bound by rule against perpetuities and suspension-of-
alienation rules).
53. See N.Y. EST. PoWERS & TRUST LAW, § 8-1.1(a) (depicting charitable trust
characteristics in naming trustees).
2011] 273
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trustee. 54 If no one is named as trustee, the title will vest in "the
court having jurisdiction over the trust."55
In defining whether a trust is charitable, it is essential to note
the purpose of the gift.5 6 If a benevolent purpose can be construed
from the testamentary language, then the language should be inter-
preted liberally to uphold the gift.5 7 For example, the awarding of
a specific prize for merit is important because it honors a worthy
purpose.5 8 The reward "encourage [s] noble aspirations for the
benefit of the participants, and of a community, or of mankind."59
This is controversial, though, and does not mean that any trust that
promotes sports by awarding a prize is charitable.6 0 Rather, the
classification of a trust that promotes sports as charitable rests on
the nature and purpose behind the sport.
B. Parol Evidence Rule
Sometimes the legal community purposefully uses vague and
ambiguous language to its advantage.6 1 This can be quite benefi-
cial when drafting contracts and statutes in order to allow for flexi-
bility and unforeseen contingencies. 6 2 Other times, though,
54. See id. at § 8-1.1(b) (noting that charitable trusts can name corporations as
trustees).
55. Id. at § 8-1.1 (a)
56. See In re Harmon's Will, 80 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909-10 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1948) (not-
ing that charitable trust must have charitable purpose behind it).
57. See id. at 910 (holding that if charitable purpose can be construed from
language of will, then will should be interpreted broadly in order to uphold that
charitable purpose).
58. See id. at 909-10 (deeming award for merit in aeronautics charitable be-
cause it promotes achievement and aspirations that benefit mankind and have no
apparent private or selfish purpose).
59. Id. at 910.
60. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. n (1959) ("A trust
merely for the promotion of sport is not charitable.").
61. See Samuel A. Terilli, Inartful Drafting Does Not Necessarily a Void, as Opposed
To a Vague, Statute Make - Even Under the First Amendment: The Eleventh Circuit Applies
Common Sense to "Common Understanding" In Void-For-Vagueness Challenges to Lobbying
Regulations, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793, 794 (2009) (explaining how vague drafting by
legislatures can be precisely what is needed to effectuate legal principles). In par-
ticular, Professor Terilli argues that, aside from technical components and possibly
open-ended meanings, language has common sense elements upon which legisla-
tors often rely to effectuate a broad legislative goal. See id. at 793-95 (discussing
how Florida legislature, seeking to regulate lobbying of government officials, "es-
sentially employed a little ambiguity to get at an ambiguous subject").
62. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALs 572
(Univ. Casebook Series ed., Foundation Press, 6th ed. 2001) (1965) (noting how
contract drafters find it convenient to use vague terms "as a means of delegating
decisions to a later adjudicator at such time as a dispute on particular facts
arise[ ]"); see also United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) (allowing am-
biguous reading of "near" as constitutional in statute prohibiting forest fires).
[Vol. 18: p. 267
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imprecise language can lead to confusion.63 When dealing with a
legal instrument that has multiple interpretations, courts can look
at extrinsic evidence to fill in the gaps regarding the author's in-
tent.64 If the document is unambiguous, however, then the court
must only look at the writing itself and not try to uncover the au-
thor's intent through other sources.65 This interpretive principle is
known as the parol evidence rule.6 6
The point of the parol evidence rule is to enforce a document
as close as possible to what the original drafter intended.67 With
some exceptions, this principle can be applied to contracts, deeds
and many other legal documents. 68 The reasoning for this rule is
that the document itself is the best evidence of what the drafter
intended.69 When applying this rule, the reviewing court must first
determine whether there is ambiguity in the document's terms that
may give rise to alternative applications.70 If so, then certain extrin-
sic evidence may be brought in to help prove the original drafter's
intent.71
63. See Gerald Lebovits, Legal-Writing Ethics - Part II, 77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 57, 57
(2005) (noting how vague writing damages legal effectiveness).
64. See New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 55 N.E. 299, 301 (N.Y. 1899)
(holding that extrinsic language can only be considered when language in will is
ambiguous).
65. See id. at 301 (stating that unambiguous language in will is dispositive). Cf
Cent. Union Trust Co. v. Trimble, 174 N.E. 72, 73 (N.Y 1930) (stating that rules of
construction are only to be applied to interpret ambiguous or doubtful meaning).
66. See FARNSWORTH ET AL, supra note 62, at 555 (identifying and explaining
parol evidence rule).
67. See id. at 559 (stating rationale behind parol evidence rule is to affirm
intention of drafter).
68. See David E. Nykanen, The Danger of the Unintended Uncapping: Issues in Es-
tate Planning and Financing Transactions, 36 MICH. REAL. PROP. REv. 138, 139 (2009)
(providing examples of when parol evidence rule was used in application to life
estates and life leases); David Steuer, A Litigator's Perspective on the Drafting of Com-
mercial Contracts, 1780 PRAc. L. INsT.: CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 459, 477
(providing examples of exceptions to parol evidence rule). See generally FARNs-
WORTH ET AL., supra note 62, at 555-71 (applying parol evidence rule to variety of
legal documents).
69. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d
87, 93 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that original deed's words are what drafter intended to
say).
70. See New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 55 N.E. 299, 301 (N.Y. 1899)
(noting that reviewing court must look at document first to see if there is any
ambiguity or doubt in its language before going to extrinsic evidence).
71. See id. (stating that only after ambiguity is found can courts look to extrin-
sic evidence to fill in gaps left by ambiguous writing).
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C. Cy Pres Doctrine
Another principle that New York courts have available to them
is the cy pres doctrine.72 The cy pres doctrine is applicable to charita-
ble trusts whenthe court determines that compliance with the in-
strument is "impracticable or impossible."73 Upon this
determination, the court may make an order specifically directing
the application of the deed such that it "will most effectively accom-
plish its general purposes."74 Thus, before the court can apply ref-
ormation to the will, the court must make a determination that the
reformation would likely have been approved of by the decedent.75
Unlike the parol evidence rule, the cy pres doctrine may only be
used by the court when its application is raised by either the trustee
or "the person having custody of the property."76
D. Equitable Deviation Doctrine
Another method for analyzing a trust is the doctrine of equita-
ble deviation, which is similar to the cy pres doctrine, except equita-
ble deviation only applies to altering administrative provisions in
the trust as opposed to substantive provisions.77 The first prong of
equitable deviation requires that circumstances surrounding the
will have changed.78 The second prong looks to determine if the
72. See N.Y.EsT. PowERs & TRUST LAW, § 8-1.1(c) (1) (McKinney 2009) (al-
lowing New York courts use of cy pres doctrine).
73. See id. (granting New York courts use of cy pres under condition that strict
compliance to document is "impractical or impossible"). Compare Bd. of Tr. of
Museum of Am. Indian, Heye Found. v Bd. of Tr. of Huntington Free Library &
Reading Room, 610 N.Y.S.2d 488, 501 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that because
library could still exist with someone benefiting, no cy pres was allowed), with In re
Bd. of Tr. of Huntington Free Library & Reading Room, 771 N.Y.S.2d. 69, 71 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (holding use of cy pres valid because Huntington Library had ran
out of money and essential to sell books to continue existence).
74. N.Y.EsT. POWERS & TRUST LAW, § 8-1.1(c) (1).
75. See In re Hummel, 817 N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (using cy
pres doctrine to donate gift only to hospital that decedent would have approved of
and no other).
76. Compare N.Y.EST. POWERs & TRUST LAW § 8-1.1(c) (1) (stating that cy pres
can only be used by court "on application of the trustee or of the person having
custody of the property subject to the disposition"), with U.C.C. § 2-202 (2009)
(stating that court conducts preliminary review to determine ambiguity and that
evidence may be introduced by either party).
77. SeeJohnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 565 (outlining doctrine of devia-
tion and comparing it with cy pres doctrine); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66(1) (2003) (listing unanticipated circumstance when court has power
to modify administrative provision of trust).
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) (requiring that court deter-
mine that circumstances surrounding will have changed before modification).
"The court may modify an administrative or distributive provision of a trust, or
direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distributive provi-
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changes of circumstances were anticipated by the drafter.79 If the
court determines that the changes were not anticipated, the court
must examine whether the deviation or modification "further [s]
the purposes of the trust."80
Determining the difference between an administrative and
substantive provision can be difficult.81 However, the standard for
meeting the doctrine of equitable deviation is not as strict as that of
cy pres.8 2 Deviation has been upheld in situations where there was a
more practical and efficient way to invest the original donator's
money than what was called for in the will.83 Under these circum-
stances, it would also be the duty of the trustee to petition the court
for appropriate modification of or deviation from the terms of the
trust.8"
The different legal doctrines all have their own criteria and
uses.8 5 Whether they were raised by the court, plaintiff or defend-
ants, the court must consider each.8 6
sion, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modification or
deviation will further the purposes of the trust." Id.
79. See id. (setting second prong of deviation doctrine to be that settlor did
not foresee changed circumstances).
80. Id. The third prong of deviation doctrine is set forth to be that "modifica-
tion or deviation will further the purpose of the trust." Id.
81. SeeJoseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy Pres: A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U. L. REV.
153, 154-55 (1967) ("The terms 'substantive' and 'administrative' are obviously
conclusionary and give rise to confused and vague court decisions, particularly
when an administrative provision is of such central importance in the trust instru-
ment as to take on a substantive nature.").
82. See In re Tr. of Estate & Prop. of Diocesan Convention of N.Y., 484
N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1984) (stating that cy pres should be used when
trust is impossible to carry out, but deviation should be used when "compliance
with an administrative provision of the governing instrument impractical but does
not defeat or substantial impair the purpose of a charitable trust").
83. See id. (holding deviation to more efficient investing plan proper when
economic environment has made original investing plan inadequate for purposes
of trust or for purposes intend by grantor).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(2) (2003).
If a trustee knows or should know of circumstances that justify judicial
action [of deviation] with respect to an administrative provision, and of
the potential of those circumstances to cause substantial harm to the trust
or its beneficiaries, the trustee has a duty to petition the court for appro-
priate modification of or deviation from the terms of the trust.
Id.
85. For a further discussion of this law, see supra notes 48-87 and accompany-
ing text.
86. For a further discussion of this law, see infra notes 87-141 and accompany-
ing text.
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IV. THE COURT'S RULING IN GOLDEN GATE YACHT CLUB
The New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by
Judge Ciparick, decided to reverse the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division's holding in Golden Gate Yacht Club and rule in favor of the
plaintiff, GGYC.87 The Club's claim turned on the interpretation of
paragraph four of the Deed of Gift, which outlined the require-
ments of becoming a Challenger of Record.88 Paraphrasing the
Deed, the court determined that:
a challenger must be (1) an organized yacht club, (2) for-
eign, in that it is not of the same country as the trustee
yacht club, (3) incorporated in its local jurisdiction or offi-
cially recognized either through a license or patent from
its government, (4) and "having for its annual regatta an
ocean water court on the sea, or on an arm of the sea, or
one which combines both."8 9
The court held that the phrase, "having for its annual regatta,"
is unambiguous, requiring that the challenger has held an annual
regatta in the past and will continue to do so in the future.90
The court also looked at the text of the Deed of Gift and evalu-
ated the phrase "having for its annual regatta" in relation to its
placement in the document.9 1 The phrase was located in a list of
requirements, constituting condition precedents that the challeng-
ing yacht club must meet before it could become the Challenger of
Record.92 Among those on the list were requirements that the chal-
lenging yacht club be "organized, . . . incorporated, patented, or
87. See Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Socit6 Nautique De Geneve, 907 N.E.2d
276, 278 (N.Y. 2009) (noting opinion of court reversing lower court's ruling).
88. See id. at 281 (stating GGYC's reasoning behind their claim). For a further
discussion on the claim, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. The rele-
vant part of the Deed of Gift states that:
[a] ny organized Yacht Club of a foreign country, incorporated, patented,
or licensed by the legislature, admiralty, or other executive department,
having for its annual regatta an ocean water course on the sea, or on an
arm of the sea, or one which combines both, shall always be entitled to
the right of sailing a match for this Cup.
Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 4.
89. Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 280-81.
90. Id. at 281 ("[W]e conclude that the settlor intended to link the annual
regatta requirement to the other eligibility requirements in that the challenging
yacht club has in the past and will continue in the future 'having' an annual
regatta.").
91, Id. (stating that list including "annual regatta" requirements had charac-
teristics requiring past, present and future attributes).
92. See Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 4 (listing requirements that must be
fulfilled before yacht club can become Challenger of Record).
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licensed."9 3 The drafter mentioned these requirements in the past
tense and "intended that a challenger would continue to meet
these eligibility requirements in the present and future."94 By list-
ing the annual regatta within a string of prerequisites, the court
determined that the donator meant for this requirement to be in-
terpreted in the same manner.9 5 Furthermore, the word "annual"
connotes the notion that there was an event in the past and there
will continue to be regular events in the future.9 6
CNEV claimed that the annual regattas that they held since
their Notice of Challenge in July 2007 fulfilled the annual regatta
requirement.97 At the time of the ruling, CNEV held regattas in
November of 2007 and 2008.98 The first regatta was within five
months after their Notice of Challenge submission.99 The court,
however, did not consider this fact as bearing any weight on the
issue.100 The court ruled that the requirements outlined in the
93. Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 281 (citing Deed of Gift, supra note
10, 4) (noting that place of requirement in list of requirements effects meaning
of phrase "annual regatta"). Paragraph four of the Deed of Gift in its entirety
reads:
Any organized Yacht Club of a foreign country, incorporated, patented,
or licensed by the legislature, admiralty, or other executive department,
having for its annual regatta on ocean water course on the sea, or on an
arm of the sea, or one which combines both, shall always be entitled to
the right of sailing a match for this Cup, with a yacht or vessel propelled
by sails only and constructed in the country to which the Challenging
Club belongs, against any one yacht or vessel constructed in the country
of the Club holding the Cup.
Id.
94. Id. The court stated:
[W]e first note that the annual regatta requirement is in only one of a list
of eligibility requirements set forth in the Deed of Gift. The settlor
clearly placed the requirements of "organized" and "incorporated, pat-
ented, or licensed" in the past and intended that a challenger would con-
tinue to meet these eligibility requirements in the present and future.
Id. (quoting Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 4).
95. See id. (noting that placement of phrase affects meaning of phrase).
96. See id. ("By using the word 'annual,' the settlor suggested an event that has
already occurred at least once and will occur regularly in the future.").
97. See id. (arguing that as long as requirement is fulfilled by race day, chal-
lenge is valid).
98. See id. at 281 n.9 (explaining that CNEV conducted ocean course regattas
in November 2007 and November 2008).
99. See id. (noting that date of CNEV's first regatta, November 2007, was five
months after its submission of its Notice of Challenge in July 2007).
100. See id. at 281-82 (holding that even though regattas have been held post
submission of Notice of Challenge, this holds no bearing on them fulfilling re-
quirements by time of submission).
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Deed of Gift must be fulfilled by submission of a challenging yacht
club's Notice of Challenge.101
The court also dismissed the defendant's claim that tradition
has allowed for this requirement to be waived.10 2 SNG and CNEV
argued that because of an existing practice between the Defender
and Challenger of Record to allow Mutual Consent Challengers to
race, without having held annual regattas, there is evidence that the
drafter intended the requirement to be capable of being waived.1 03
However, the court rejected this argument, stating that because the
language in the annual regatta clause is unambiguous, the defend-
ants' assertion was irrelevant. 104 Furthermore, even if the Deed was
ambiguous, the defendants' assertion would not have been disposi-
tive.105 Mutual Consent Challengers appeared much later than the
authorship of the Deed of Gift and the court had to determine the
intention of the testator at the time the will was created.106 Specifi-
cally, a tradition that arose after the drafting of the Deed of Gift
does not have any bearing on the requirements to become the
Challenger of Record.107 Such a tradition must not be considered
unless the drafting language is vague or uncertain.108
101. See id. (citing Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 10) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) ("When read in the context of the entire Deed of Gift, the chal-
lenger must demonstrate that its Notice of Challenge 'fulfill[s] all the conditions
required' at the time it submits its challenge.").
102. See id. at 282 (holding that traditions arising after drafting of Deed of
Gift have no weight on determining Challenger of Record).
103. See id. (asserting defendants' claim that practice of allowing Mutual Con-
sent Challengers who have not met annual regatta requirement in protocols is
evidence that settlor intended for them to participate).
104. See id. (noting that because defendant "failed to show that at the time it
submitted its Notice of Challenge it was a '[c]lub fulfilling all the conditions re-
quired by' the Deed of Gift, it does not qualify as the Challenger of Record . . .").
105. See id. ("This assertion has no merit because the plain language of the
Deed of Gift itself forecloses such an illogical conclusion.").
106. See id. (finding that practice of Mutual Consent Challengers emerged
much later than creation of Deed of Gift); see also In re Harmon's Will, 80 N.Y.S.2d
903, 906 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1948) (citing In re Chamberlin's Estate, 46 N.E.2d 883, 886
(N.Y. 1948)) ("It is the duty of the court to ascertain the intention of testator at the
time the will was made."). "And such intention when ascertained must prevail
even though the expression of such intention be ambiguous or incomplete." Id.
(citing Cahill v. Russell, 35 N.E. 664 (N.Y. 1893)).
107. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 282 (holding that post drafting
traditions do not affect interpretation of intent by original drafter).
108. See id. (holding that only ambiguous language will give rise to court con-
sidering post drafting traditions).
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V. INTERPRETING THE APPLICABLE LEGAL DOCTRINES IN
GOLDEN GATE YACHT CLUB
The court's reading of the document was a clear application of
the parol evidence rule. 0 9 The court interpreted the Deed of Gift
as unambiguous and found for the plaintiff.'10
Contrary to the court's decision in Mercury Bay, what the Golden
Gate Yacht Club court neglected to consider was whether the Deed
of Gift is actually a charitable trust.' There is some authority for
disallowing it as a charitable trust.11 2 Historically, a charitable trust
used to promote a sport, particularly yacht racing, was not upheld
as a valid trust.'13 Although the Restatement (First) of Trusts does
not mention the applicability of a charitable trust for a purely sport-
ing purpose, this concept was explicitly prohibited in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts.114 At the time of Mercury Bay, the Second
109. See id. at 281 (finding that phrase "annual regatta" clearly shows intent of
original drafter and, therefore, no extrinsic evidence ought to be looked at to
determine intent of original drafter).
110. See id. at 280-81 (holding that "annual regatta" requirement was clear,
that defendant did not meet this requirement and, therefore, ruling in favor of
plaintiff).
111. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d
87, 95 n.4 (N.Y. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 (1959)); In
re Nottage, (1895) 2 Ch. 649 (U.K)) (recognizing that there is authority that
would consider Deed of Gift not true charitable trust, but dismissing it because it
was not raised by any of parties); George Schuyler Trust: Would It Stand Scrutiny?, BYM
NEWS.COM (May 2009), http://www.bymnews.com/americas-cup-33/george-schuy-
ler-trust.php [hereinafter George Schuyler Trust] (discussing validity of Deed of Gift
as legitimate trust under current law).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. n ("A trust merely for
the promotion of sports is not charitable."); In reNottage, (1895) 2 Ch. 649, 652-54
(U.K.) (holding that trust merely for promotion of sport is not true charitable
trust). In fact, at the time of the writing of the Deed of Gift, it was not legal in the
state of New York to create a charitable trust. See FISCH, supra note 50, at 36-37
(chronicling history behind charitable trusts in America).
113. See In re Nottage, (1895) 2 Ch. 649, 652-54 (U.K.) (holding that trust
establishing annual cup to be awarded to most successfully raced yacht is not true
charitable trust). The court there held that, although yacht racing implies the
community of ship builders and those affiliated with the sport, the trust itself did
not directly specify any class of community that the cup was intended to benefit
and thus it failed as a charitable trust. See id. (neglecting to specify class of commu-
nity trust was to benefit). This is still the case in England, with few exceptions. See
BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 379 (comparing charitable trusts in England and
America).
114. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 374 (1935) (failing to men-
tion any prohibition on using promotion of sport as purpose behind charitable
trust), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. n (prohibiting promo-
tion of sport as legitimate purpose behind charitable trust).
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Restatement was the prevailing Restatement.115 The issue of
whether the Deed of Gift was a valid charitable trust was not consid-
ered by the court and was only raised in a footnote because it was
not raised by either one of the parties.116
The court in Golden Gate Yacht Club did not once mention the
validity of the trust.'17 At the time of its decision, the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts was the predominate Restatement." 8 The Re-
statement (Third) leaves out the prohibitive language of a charita-
ble trust for sports mentioned in the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts.'19 In fact, the Restatement (Third) almost expressly allows
charitable trusts for sports as long as the sport "provide [s] recrea-
tion and entertainment to a large class of a community." 20 The
reason the court did not entertain this issue is because neither party
to the suit raised this issue.1'2 Based on court precedent and the
substance of the Restatement (Third), if the court had discussed
the issue, it would have most likely upheld that the Deed of Gift was
a charitable trust.122
Even if the court tried to constrict the breadth of charitable
trusts, the court would have a hard time trying to find that the
America's Cup did not fit the category of the Restatement
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 (dating publication of Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts at 1959); Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc., 557 N.E.2d at
95 n.4 (recognizing Restatement (Second) of Trusts as current authority).
116. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc., 557 N.E.2d at 95 n.4 (citations omitted)
("While there is authority for the proposition that trusts created for the purpose of
promoting sporting events are not true charitable trusts, no one has disputed the
characterization of this trust as a charitable trust.").
117. See generally Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Societt Nautique De Geneve, 907
N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 2009) (failing to mention whether Deed of Gift is true charitable
trust).
118. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (dating Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts at 2003), with Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 276
(providing final ruling on April 2, 2009).
119. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (failing to prohibit pure
promotion of sport as valid purpose behind charitable trust), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. n ("A trust merely for the promotion of sports is
not charitable.").
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. 1.
121. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc., 557 N.E.2d at 95 n.4 (stating that unless
issue of true charitable trust is raised, court will not entertain it).
122. See In re Harmon's Will, 80 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909-10 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1948)
(upholding purpose of awarding prizes for achievement in aeronautics as valid
charitable trust because trustpromotes aeronautical community); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. I (recognizing promotion of sport as valid charitable
trust when it provides entertainment or recreation for large groups of commu-
nity). See also generally Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc., 557 N.E.2d at 87-100 (treating
Deed of Gift as valid charitable trust).
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(Third).123 There is a large yacht racing community worldwide,
and the Cup was designed for international competition.124 Fur-
ther, the entertainment value of yacht racing has increased over the
past twenty years, not only to the yachting community, but also to
the world as a whole. 125 Accordingly, the court could not ignore
the value that the America's Cup has as a competitive international
regatta and as a pastime for observers and rule the Deed of Gift
invalid.126
SNG's claim, that requiring a challenging yacht club to hold a
regatta prior to submitting its Notice of Challenge effectively inhib-
its the settlor's original intentions, is an argument for equitable
deviation.127 SNG illustrated how tradition permitted a non-strict
adherence to this requirement because it allowed more challengers
to participate in the America's Cup. 128 This arguably administrative
provision of the Deed would enhance the Cup as a "friendly compe-
tition between foreign countries."1 29
123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. 1 (providing promotion of
sport as valid charitable trust when sport entertains or provides recreation for large
groups of community); see alsoJared Peter Grellet, The America's Cup 2007: The
Nexus of Media, Sport and Big Business (2009) (unpublished Masters of Arts the-
sis, University of Canterbury), (on file with Macmillan Brown Library, University of
Canterbury) Canterbur (noting increase of media coverage and participation of
America's Cup over past twenty-five years).
124. See Grellet, supra note 123 (describing increase in global participation of
America's Cup regattas and challenges); see also Deed of Gift, supra note 10, T 3
(opening participation in America's Cup to any yacht club on Earth).
125. See Grellet, supra note 123 (stating that media coverage of America's Cup
has expanded, leading many to become more involved in regatta).
126. See George Schuyler Trust, supra note 111 (arguing that many yacht clubs
and investors have interest in keeping Deed of Gift valid charitable trust in order
to keep America's Cup alive); see also Grellet, supra note 123 (stating that many
non-yacht club members enjoy America's Cup and benefit from its existence
through entertainment and recreation).
127. See Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Societ6 Nautique De Geneve, 907 N.E.2d
276, 282 (N.Y. 2009) (arguing that tradition of allowing Mutual Consent Challeng-
ers exemplifies settlor's original intent behind Deed of Gift and focuses on how
challenges operate); see alsoJohnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 565 (noting that
details on how challenges operate is administrative provision that can trigger
deviation).
128. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 282 (claiming that practice of
allowing Mutual Consent Challengers opens America's Cup regatta to more yacht
clubs and furthers it as "Cup for friendly competition between foreign countries");
Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 3 (stating that Cup "shall be preserved as a perpetual
Challenge Cup for friendly competition between foreign countries").
129. Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 3). SeeJohnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at
565 (arguing that changing administrative provisions of how challenges operate
would lead to more efficient practices).
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In rejecting this argument the court based its finding on the
parol evidence rule. 130 Applying the doctrine of equitable devia-
tion, however, the result would have been the same.131 SNG's
claims may be technically correct, but they do not fully satisfy the
doctrine. 3 2 The circumstances surrounding the issue are ones that
Schulyer, the settlor, certainly foresaw.' 33 The very fact that certain
requirements were set forth in the Deed of Gift that a yacht club
must meet before becoming a challenger is evidence that Schulyer
knew that restrictions would be necessary for maintaining good
sportsmanship in the regatta. 134 Because of Schulyer's considera-
tion and his reference to an annual regatta requirement, SNG's ar-
gument does not meet the first prong of the equitable deviation
doctrine.' 35
Any cy pres argument would similarly fail.' 36 In Mercury Bay, a cy
pres application was raised and litigated and arguably should have
been applied.' 37 If the Golden Gate Yacht Club court were to stay
congruent with the trend of the Mercury Bay court, then it would
not have used a cy pres argument either. 38
130. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 282 (rejecting SNG's Mutual
Consent Challengers claim based on unambiguous language of document).
131. For a further discussion of this law, see infra notes 132-36 and accompa-
nying text.
132. Compare Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 282 (claiming that waiving
requirement of holding annual regatta would increase participation and use of
Cup as one for friendly competition), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 66(1) (noting that circumstance must be one not contemplated by original
settlor).
133. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 281 (noting that settlor inserted
requirement of holding annual regatta, implying that settlor recognized that yacht
clubs that do not hold annual regattas would still like to challenge for Cup).
134. SeeJohnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 549-51 (noting that settlor in-
serted certain requirements after complications arose under original Deed of Gift,
which had no such requirements). This specific requirement, that they hold an
annual regatta, which was added later to the Deed of Gift, did nothing to actually
perpetuate friendly competition and had an initially poor reaction by the yachting
community. See id. (discussing requirement of annual regatta). (Nevertheless, it
still shows that requirements were considered by Schulyer who hoped that they
would "provid[e] a 'well made' match for the defender." Id. (citations omitted).
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) (providing first prong of
deviation doctrine that original settlor did not conceive change in circumstances).
See also Deed of Gift, supra note 10, 1 4 (listing requirements precludes possibility
that settlor did not conceive circumstance that challenger might not meet
requirements).
136. For a further discussion of this law, see infra notes 137-141 and accompa-
nying text.
137. SeeJohnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 560-61 (noting that circumstances
surrounding Mercury Bay would have been ideal for application of cy pres, but that
courts are hostile to its use and, therefore, declined its application).
138. See id. (outlining trend of courts declining to apply cy pres doctrine).
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Furthermore, even if SNG attempted to use cy pres, it would
have failed.' 39 The cy pres doctrine requires that abiding by the
trust is "impracticable or impossible."140 The fact that there is a
challenger who can meet the requirements of the Deed of Gift, as
interpreted by the court, shows that the Deed of Gift is not imprac-
ticable or impossible to folloW. 1 4 1
VI. "THIS IS A 159 YEAR OLD TROPHY, LET'S LOOK AFrER IT" 142
Golden Gate Yacht Club has set the precedent for the interpreta-
tion of the Deed of Gift.143 Over the years, the Deed of Gift was
modified and corrected by first the original donors, and second by
the New York courts. 144 All of these corrections led some commen-
tators to claim that the Deed ought to be rewritten due to its
impracticality. 145
This case gave the courts a chance to alter the interpretation of
the Deed. 146 Had the reviewing court affirmed the lower court's
judgment, the Deed would have been deemed ambiguous.147 Ex-
trinsic evidence would have been considered, encouraging future
yacht clubs to challenge the Deed and argue for an interpretation
139. For a further discussion of this law, see infra notes 140-42 and accompa-
nying text.
140. See N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUST IAw 49, § 8-1.1(c)(1) (McKinney 2009)
(outlining when cy pres doctrine is appropriate for New York courts).
141. See Bd. of Trs. of Museum of Am. Indian, Heye Found. v Bd. of Trs. of
Huntington Free Library & Reading Room, 610 N.Y.S.2d 488, 501 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (holding that no cy pres was allowed because it was not impossible to carry
out intent of Huntington Library, that library could still exist with at least one
person benefiting).
142. Russell Coutts, THEY SAID. . . QUOTES FROM BMW ORACLE RACING AND
ALINcH, http://33rd.americascup.com/en/actualite/news/they-saidquotes-from-
bmw-oracle-racing-and-alinghi-19-2913 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
143. See Friedman , supra note 8 (noting that court's interpretation of Deed of
Gift in Golden Gate Yacht Club has set standard for its interpretation).
144. See generally Johnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 547-54 (outlining pro-
gress of Deed of Gift and its modifications throughout its existence); RAYNER, supra
note 3, at 44, 48-50 (chronicling alterations to Deed of Gift and regattas that
caused such alterations).
145. See Friedman, supra note 8 (recognizing that many commentaries have
called for Deed of Gift to be rewritten due to its dated language). See alsoJohnson
& Taylor, supra note 22, at 584-85 (arguing that Deed of Gift ought to be rewritten
through application of cy pres doctrine).
146. See Golden Gate Yacht Club v. Socidt6 Nautique De Genove, 907 N.E.2d
276, 281 (N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that reviewing court could have affirmed and
ruled that Deed of Gift was ambiguous and extrinsic evidence was needed for its
interpretation).
147. See id. at 280 (stating lower court's holding that Deed of Gift was ambigu-
ous and required extrinsic evidence for its interpretation).
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to their liking.14 8 Instead, the court read the Deed for what it was
and faithfully abided by it.14 9 Accordingly, this interpretation will
set the scene for future applications of the Deed of Gift and, conse-
quently, for future America's Cup matches.1 5 0
This interpretation has also continued the general trend
against the use of modification doctrines, such as cy pres and devia-
tion.15 1 The court chose to use a more solidified doctrine, the pa-
rol evidence rule, instead.15 2 Using a modification doctrine instead
of the parol evidence rule would probably have yielded the same
result.'5 3 Not even mentioning it, however, perpetuates the avoid-
ance and underdevelopment of those doctrines.154
The case has also established precedential law in the area of
charitable trusts.' 55 The clarity of using competitive sports as a
charitable purpose was hazy at best.15 6 Although Mercury Bay paved
the way for courts to rule competitive sports as non-charitable, the
court did not render a definitive ruling on the matter.15 7 Golden
148. See id. at 282 (arguing that had Deed of Gift been ambiguous, then par-
ties would be free to introduce outside evidence to persuade courts into ruling in
their favor). See also Bill Koch: On His Amicus Curiae & More, BYMNEWS.COM,Jan. 1,
2009, http://www.bymnews.com/americas-cup-33/bill-koch.php (stating that
wealthy yacht clubs would do everything that they could to try and influence courts
to rule in their favor despite what true intent of Deed of Gift may be).
149. See Friedman, supra note 8 (noting that court in Golden Gate Yacht Club
read Deed of Gift literally, found it unambiguous and applied its language); Golden
Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 281 (holding Deed of Gift unambiguous and apply-
ing its requirements literally).
150. See Friedman, supra note 8 (predicting future interpretations of Deed of
Gift based off of court's reasoning in Golden Gate Yacht Club).
151. SeeJohnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 560-61 (noting trend in American
courts to shy away from using modification doctrines such as cy pres or deviation);
FISCH, supa note 50, at 9 (chronicling history of nonuse by American courts of cy
pres doctrine).
152. See Golden Gate Yacht Club, 907 N.E.2d at 281 (using parol evidence rule to
determine outcome of case). Compare FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 62, at 555-60
(discussing parol evidence rule and its wide application and grounded rules), with
Johnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 560-61 (noting confusion held by American
courts over cy pres and deviation doctrines).
153. For a further discussion of this law, see supra notes 131-41 and accompa-
nying text.
154. See generally Johnson & Taylor, supra note 22, at 560 to 67 (recognizing
that courts shy away from cy pres and deviation doctrines and that through court
avoidance doctrines remain stagnant principals of law).
155. See N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUST LAW, § 8-1.1 (McKinney 2009) (including
Golden Gate Yacht Club in its referencing Notes of Decisions under Persons or
Things Benefitted # 64 that influence application of New York law).
156. For a further discussion of this law, see supra notes 49-61, 112-23 and
accompanying text.
157. See Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d
87, 95 n.4 (N.Y. 1990) (referencing authority that might be used to disallow Deed
of Gift as true charitable trust). See also George Schuyler Trust, supra note 111 (ques-
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Gate Yacht Club stopped any possible momentum towards a non-
charitable ruling and has now set precedent for these types of
sports-related charitable trusts.15 8
Such a broad reading of a charitable trust is not without its
consequences.159 Charitable trusts are appealing for a variety of
reasons, mostly because they are not subject to the rule against per-
petuities and suspension-of-alienation rules.160 They can also name
a corporation as trustee, or no trustee at all, and will still be valid.16'
This type of flexibility is quite popular and ideal for colleges and
universities, churches, hospitals, scientific research organizations
and other groups. 62
Assets for charitable organizations are in the hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars.163 This is mainly because they offer certain tax ben-
efits.164 Congress, however, has yet to define "charitable" and relies
on judicial interpretation.165 This has led to a set of upper echelon
of charitable purposes that are traditionally and universally up-
tioning validity of Deed of Gift as actual charitable trust and suggesting Mercury Bay
Boating Club Inc. as opportunity for court to rule either way on this issue, but de-
clined to do so).
158. See Friedman, supra note 8 (recognizing Golden Gate Yacht Club as new
precedent for interpretation of Deed of Gift). See also N.Y. EsT. PowEs & TRUST
LAw, § 8-1.1 (referencing Golden Gate Yacht Club as influential upon New York
courts).
159. See Mary Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty In the Charitable Pur-
poses Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1341, 1342 (1995) ("[D]eciding what causes and
ideas may be deemed charitable is extremely important and can have far-reaching
consequences.").
160. See In re Hamilton's Will, 63 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946)
(holding that rule against perpetuities and suspension-of-alienation rules do not
apply to charitable trusts).
161. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW, § 8-1.1(a) (declaring that charitable
trusts can name either no trustee or corporation as trustee and still be held valid in
New York).
162. See BLEVINS, ET AL., supra note 49, at 180 (claiming that charitable trusts
are widely used by "educational, religious, scientific, medical, or other groups").
163. See Lars G. Gustafsson, The Definition of "Charitable"for Federal Income Tax
Purposes: Deftocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33
Hous. L. REv. 587, 590 (1996) (citations omitted) (citing that in 1991, there were
439,974 charitable "organizations (excluding private foundations and most relig-
ious organizations) [that] had assets totaling $777.5 billion and annual revenues of
$491.1 billion, of which $87.5 billion constituted contributions, gifts, and grants").
164. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501 (a), (c) (3) (2006) (listing charitable organizations as
those which are exempt from further taxation under this subtitle); BLEVINS, ET AL.,
supra note 49, at 174-75 (describing some tax benefits afforded to charitable
trusts). See also Gustafsson, supra note 163, at 589-90 (stating that donators to char-
itable organizations are allowed certain tax deductions).
165. See Gustafsson, supra note 163, at 590 (noting that Congress has failed to
accurately define "charitable" and relies on judiciary to define it).
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held.16 6 But decline to define "charitable" has also led to a range of
fringe trusts ranging "from the sublime to the ridiculous." 16 7 As a
result of Golden Gate Yacht Club's broader interpretation of charita-
ble purposes, more donors and organizations will apply for charita-
ble trusts. 168 Thus, although the case at bar has set the standard for
interpreting the Deed of Gift, with courts less likely to use modifica-
tion doctrines and the likely increase of applications for charitable
trusts, Golden Gate Yacht Club will make certain that the America's
Cup will not be the last contest in America's courts. 69
Joseph F. Dorflr*
166. See id. at 613-17 (describing implications of not having concrete defini-
tion of "charitable" and leaving it to judiciary to decide its meaning).
167. Lundwall, supra note 159, at 1342 (citations omitted) ). Among the vari-
ous qualifying organizations, such as hospitals, libraries, and churches, other at-
tempts by organizations to be declared charitable have included: "[to] establish
scholarships for those who receive the lowest scores in a golf tournament,...
provide shoes for indigent actors[,]. . . to espouse vegetarianism... [and] to estab-
lish a charitable trust to hire musicians to play dirges and march to the cemetery
on his birthday and other holidays." Id.
168. See id. at 1341-45 (arguing that people will continue to push boundaries
of charitable trust definition, which can have far reaching consequences on
society).
169. For a further discussion on how Golden Gate Yacht Club set the standard
for interpreting the Deed of Gift, see supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion on how courts are less likely to use modification doctrines,
see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. For a further discussion on how
charitable trust applications are likely to increase, see supra notes 159-68.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Villanova University School of Law; BS in Mathe-
matics & BA in Economics, Dec. 2007, College of William and Mary
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